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ABSTRACT 
A paramount objective of all human-rated launch and reentry 
vehicle developers is to ensure that the risks to both the crew 
onboard and the public are minimized within reasonable cost, 
schedule, and technical constraints. Past experience has shown 
that proper attention to range safety requirements necessary to 
ensure public safety must be given early in the design phase to 
avoid additional operational complexities or threats to the 
safety of people onboard, and the design engineers must give 
these requirements the same consideration as crew safety 
requirements. For human spaceflight, the primary purpose and 
operational concept for any flight safety system is to protect 
the public while maximizing the likelihood of crew survival.  
This paper will outline the policy considerations, technical 
issues, and operational impacts regarding launch and reentry 
vehicle failure scenarios where crew and public safety are 
intertwined and thus addressed optimally in an integrated 
manner. An overview of existing range and crew safety policy 
requirements will be presented. Application of these 
requirements and lessons learned from both the Space Shuttle 
and Constellation Programs will also be discussed. Using 
these past programs as examples, the paper will detail 
operational, design, and analysis approaches to mitigate and 
balance the risks to people onboard and in the public. Crewed 
vehicle perspectives from the Federal Aviation Administration 
and Air Force organizations that oversee public safety will be 
summarized as well. Finally, the paper will emphasize the 
need to factor policy, operational, and analysis considerations 
into the early design trades of new vehicles to help ensure that 
both crew and public safety are maximized to the greatest 
extent possible. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
For general space launch and reentry vehicles, a key 
component in design and operations is range safety. The 
vehicle developer is responsible for ensuring the vehicle meets 
range safety requirements as set forth by the governing launch 
range. Human-rated vehicles offer a unique design challenge 
in that crew risk must also be taken in to account along with 
public risk. In many cases, the optimal design solution to 
minimize public risk is non-optimal with regard to crew risk. 
This paper details current requirements on public and crew 
safety. It also shares key trades from the Space Shuttle and 
Constellation Programs as well as lessons learned from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Air Force (AF) 
45th Space Wing regarding crew and public risk and the 
balance between the two. 
 
2. CURRENT RANGE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
2.1  AFSPC Range Regulations: The Headquarters (HQ) Air 
Force Space Command (AFSPC) operates the AFSPC ranges: 
30th Space Wing [Western Range] at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base (VAFB), California and the 45th Space Wing [Eastern 
Range (ER)] at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. The AFSPC 
ER is currently the only U.S. range supporting crewed space 
flight. As specified in AFSPC Instruction (AFSPCI) 91-701 
[1], the AFSPC Commander (AFSPC/CC) is responsible for 
establishing range safety policy for AFSPC ranges. HQ 
AFSPC is responsible for establishing common range safety 
user requirements as outlined in AFSPC Manual 
(AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements [2], 
for the AFSPC space wings to implement and enforce.  
AFSPCMAN 91-710 defines responsibilities and authorities; 
delineates policies, processes, and approvals, and approval 
levels for all activities from or onto AFSPC ranges. These 
activities include the life cycle of launch vehicles and 
payloads from design concept, test, checkout, assembly, and 
launch to orbital insertion or impact. Currently all U.S. crewed 
space flight vehicles are launched from the ER, and therefore 
all crewed space flight programs must ultimately comply with 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 regarding public safety requirements. 
The document defines range user responsibilities and 
describes AFSPC range safety and range user interfaces at 
both AFSPC ranges. A range user is any individual or 
organization that conducts or supports any activity on 
resources (land, sea, or air) owned or controlled by AFSPC 
ranges. Example organizations include the Department of 
Defense (DoD), United States government agencies, civilian 
launch operators like the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and foreign government agencies and 
other foreign entities. These organizations use AFSPC range 
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facilities and test equipment; conduct prelaunch and launch 
operations, including payloads to orbital insertion or impact; 
and/or require on-orbit or other related support. Therefore, 
when launching crewed space vehicles from the Kennedy 
Space Center, NASA is a range user of the ER, with sole 
responsibility for crew safety. 
The responsibility for protecting the public, launch area, and 
launch complex personnel and resources is of paramount 
consideration in range launch operations. As a range user, 
NASA seeks to maximize both crew and public safety within 
the cost, schedule, and technical constraints placed on a given 
launch (and/or reentry) vehicle project / program. Therefore, 
when launching a crewed vehicle from an AFSPC Range, 
NASA must not only comply with the AFSPCMAN 91-710 
requirements for public safety, but also with its internal NASA 
Procedural Requirements for crew safety. The Space Wing 
Commanders (SW/CCs) have overall authority and 
responsibility for public safety at AFSPC ranges as directed by 
the AFSPC/CC. This delegation is provided via the Major 
Command (MAJCOM) chain of command and Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap 
Prevention Program [3].  
It is the policy of the ranges to ensure that the risk to the 
public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and 
resources is managed to an acceptable level. This policy is 
implemented by employing risk management in three 
categories of safety:  Public Safety, Launch Area Safety, and 
Launch Complex Safety. The range user is required to manage 
risk to the lowest level, consistent with mission requirements, 
and in consonance with AFSPC range launch risk guidance. 
Individual hazardous activities may exceed guidance based on 
national need after implementation of available cost-effective 
mitigation. It is the policy of the ranges to avoid the use of 
waivers. However, the Space Wing Commanders (SW/CC) 
have the authority to tailor or waive any requirement in 
AFSPCMAN 91-710. Based on national need, and the 
approval of the SW Commanders, non-FAA licensed launches 
may be permitted using a predicted risk above criteria as 
shown in Fig. 1 in accordance with AFI 91-217, Space Safety 
and Mishap Prevention Program [4].  
 
Figure 1. AFSPC Range General Public Aggregated Risk 
Criteria for Non-FAA Licensed Launches. 
Refer to AFSPCI 91-701 for risk approval levels at the two 
AFSPC ranges. Range Commanders Council (RCC) Standard 
321-10 [5] provides relevant background information on 
launch risk acceptability. AFI 91-217 provides overarching 
space safety, mishap prevention and mission effectiveness 
guidance for acquisition, testing, and operations of terrestrial, 
launch, orbital and kinetic/directed energy space systems. This 
document establishes risk criteria for launch through orbital 
insertion and reentry risk criteria for each reentering object. It 
also establishes roles and responsibilities. From lift off to 
orbital insertion, SW/CCs have safety (personnel/asset 
protection) responsibilities. A U.S. consensus standard, RCC 
321-10, defines orbital insertion in the following manner: 
“orbital insertion occurs when the vehicle achieves a minimum 
70 nm perigee based on a computation that accounts for drag.” 
This definition has been accepted by the Air Force as 
documented in a recently released Interim Change to AFI 91-
217. After orbital insertion, safety (personnel/space asset 
protection) becomes the sole responsibility of the range user, 
such as NASA. This is further documented in the National 
Space Policy.  
In order to effectively implement AFSPC Range Safety 
Policies certain components have been identified as Range 
Safety Critical Systems, which include all airborne and ground 
subsystems of the Flight Safety System (FSS). The FSS 
consists of airborne and ground Flight Termination Systems 
(FTSs), airborne and ground Range Tracking System (RTS), 
and the Telemetry Data Transmitting System (TDTS). The 
ground FSS also includes any hardware or software system, 
subsystem, or elements thereof that could 1) prevent the 
Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO) from stopping the 
launch of a vehicle, determining the performance of a nominal 
or non-nominal launch vehicle, or commanding flight 
termination action; or 2) cause unauthorized issuance of FTS 
commands.  
All AFSPC Range Safety Critical Systems shall be designed to 
ensure that no single point of failure, including both hardware 
and software, will deny the capability to monitor and 
terminate, or result in the inadvertent termination of, a launch 
vehicle or payload, as applicable. When possible, AFSPC 
Range Safety critical systems shall be designed to be dual fault 
tolerant against failure in hardware and software and still 
provide overall system redundancy. 
The reliability requirements of the FSS are as follows: 
• The overall airborne and ground FTS reliability goal 
is 0.9981 at the 95 percent confidence level.  
• The airborne FTS reliability goal shall be a minimum 
of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level for global 
positioning systems and 0.95 at the 95 percent 
confidence level for transponder systems.  
• The ground FTS shall have a reliability of 0.999 at 
the 95 percent confidence level for a 4-hour duration, 
as required.  
FTS functional requirements ensure that when initiated, 
whether by command from a MFCO or other means, such as 
automatically in the event of a vehicle failure, an FTS shall: 
• Ensure the flight-terminated vehicle’s debris impact, 
resulting from residual lift or drift under worst case 
wind conditions, will not endanger any protected 
area.  
• Be irrevocable upon termination initiation.  
• For each propulsion system that has the capability of 
reaching a protected area, terminate the flight and/or 
render the system incapable of propulsion. This 
includes each stage and any strap-on motor or 
propulsion system that is part of any payload.  
• Destroy the pressure integrity of any solid propellant 
system and terminate all thrust or ensure that any 
residual thrust causes the propulsion system to 
tumble without significant lateral or longitudinal 
deviation in the impact point.  
• Disperse any liquid propellant, whether by rupturing 
the propellant tank or other equivalent method. 
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Shutdown and/or parachute systems may be used in 
lieu of rupturing propellant tanks if the risks posed 
by an intact impact are acceptable. Determination of 
shutdown-only systems will be range and vehicle 
dependent. 
In order to control potential errant vehicle flight AFSPC 
Range Safety shall verify that all launch vehicles launched 
from or onto the ranges have a range-approved method of 
controlling errant vehicle flight to meet the objective of 
minimizing risks to the public, launch area, and launch 
complex personnel and resources. Normally, control systems 
on launch vehicles using the ranges shall consist of an airborne 
FSS that shall meet all the requirements of volumes 2 and 4 of 
AFSPCMAN 91-710. A thrust termination system may be 
considered as an alternative to an FSS. However, 
quantification of risks shall be determined and the 
requirements in Volume 2 shall still be met. The alternative 
thrust termination concept and design shall be approved by the 
SW Commander. AFSPC Range Safety shall establish flight 
termination criteria and AFSPC Range Safety mission flight 
rules to ensure that operations do not exceed acceptable public 
safety limits.  
AFSPC Range Safety shall establish and control hazardous 
launch areas and procedures to protect the public on land, on 
the sea, and in the air for each launch and launch vehicle. This 
is accomplished by ensuring that no intact launch vehicle, 
scheduled debris or payload, or launch vehicle and payload 
subsystems shall be allowed to intentionally impact on land, 
except in the launch area inside the impact limit lines. Flight 
paths and trajectories shall be designed so that normal impact 
dispersion areas do not encompass land. Safety margins shall 
be used to avoid overly restrictive flight termination (destruct) 
limits. AFSPC Range Safety policy may allow errant launch 
vehicles to fly to obtain maximum data until they would 
present an unacceptable risk to the public or until AFSPC 
Range Safety can no longer control the launch vehicle. 
In accordance with the 2011 Commercial Space Launch Act 
[6], the FAA has responsibility for public safety of 
commercially licensed launches. The AFSPC Range Safety 
requirements in AFSPCMAN 91-710 have been written with 
the intent of achieving commonality with the FAA 
requirements. The FAA performed launch site safety 
assessments (LSSAs) of the two AFSPC national launch 
ranges and determined the level of safety obtained by the 
existing range safety processes to be adequate. The FAA will 
not require a license applicant to demonstrate the adequacy of 
the range services it proposes to use if the applicable LSSA 
included those services and if those services remain adequate. 
SW Commander discretion to accept higher risk for the launch 
of government payloads does not apply to commercially 
licensed launches without a range user obtaining relief from 
the FAA [7]. 
2.2  FAA Regulations: Current FAA regulations focus on 
public safety requirements for commercially licensed launch 
vehicles because the Commercial Space Launch Amendments 
Act (CSLAA) of 2004 [8] authorized the FAA to “issue 
regulations governing the design or operation of a launch 
vehicle to protect the health and safety of crew and space 
flight participants” only to the extent necessary “to protect the 
public health and safety, safety of property, national security 
interests, and foreign policy interests of the United States,” or 
to address “design features or operating practices that have 
resulted in a serious or fatal injury” or “contributed to an 
unplanned event or series of events during a licensed or 
permitted commercial human space flight that posed a high 
risk of causing a serious or fatal injury.”  In response to the 
CSLAA, the FAA issued the regulations in 14 CFR Part 460 
[9]: a relatively sparse set of requirements for commercial 
human space flight that includes rules on crew qualifications 
and training, informed consent for crew and space flight 
participants, financial responsibility and waivers of liability. A 
“space flight participant” was defined in the CSLAA as “an 
individual, who is not crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle or 
reentry vehicle;” the term “passenger” carries legal 
implications that are not appropriate for transportation under 
the informed consent paradigm. The FAA’s current 
regulations are intended to provide an acceptable level of 
safety to the general public and ensure individuals onboard are 
aware of the risks associated with a launch or reentry. The 
FAA does not prescribe any limits on the risk accepted by 
individuals onboard a commercial launch or reentry vehicle. 
Instead, the FAA requires (in §460.9 for crew and in §460.45 
spaceflight participants) an operator to inform any spaceflight 
participant or individual serving as crew in writing that the 
United States Government has NOT certified the launch or 
reentry vehicle as safe for carrying human beings. In contrast 
to the current FAA requirements for commercial human space 
flight, 14 CFR Part 417 [10] provides a relatively extensive set 
of requirements aimed at ensuring public safety during an 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) launch, including a 
quantitative public risk acceptability criteria (in §417.107) of 
3E-5 Expected Casualties (EC) and a maximum individual risk 
of 1E-6 Probability of Casualty (PC) for each source of hazard 
from lift-off to orbital insertion. The current FAA regulations 
for a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) launch or reentry, 14 
CFR Part 431 [11], include the same quantitative public risk 
acceptability criteria for the entire mission, from lift-off 
through landing. However for orbital missions, the FAA has 
applied the public risk criteria limits separately for launch and 
reentry [12]. Thus, all FAA licensed launches and reentries are 
required to comply with quantitative public risk criteria that 
limit collective and individual risks. 
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 also 
authorizes the FAA to propose regulations for the design or 
operation of any commercially licensed crewed launch vehicle 
to protect the health and safety of crew and space flight 
participants beginning in December of 2012. Thus, the FAA 
seeks to understand past experiences, lessons learned, as well 
as potentially effective and innovative approaches related to 
the integration of crew and public safety requirements.  
 
3. CURRENT CREW SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
NASA has established crew safety requirements for crew 
transportation missions to the International Space Station. The 
Loss of Crew (LoC) requirements established for the ascent 
and entry phases are documented in the ISS Crew 
Transportation and Services Requirements Document [13]. In 
addition to the LoC requirements, the agency has a document, 
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B [14], that 
addresses procedures and technical requirements to manage 
the crew safety risk associated with human spaceflight. NPR 
8705.2B applies to the development and operation of crewed 
space systems developed by NASA used to conduct NASA 
human spaceflight missions. This NPR may apply to other 
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crewed space systems when documented in separate 
requirements or agreements. Section 3.6 of the NPR 
specifically addresses high level crew survival and abort 
requirements. 
 
4. LESSONS FROM SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 
The Space Shuttle Program provides 30 years of history and 
lessons learned for both crew and public safety, but until now, 
not a lot of attention had been placed on capturing the lessons 
learned regarding the interaction between the two. In some 
instances, certain Shuttle design features can place crew and 
public safety at odds with each other. While these risks to the 
crew and public have been carefully mitigated and balanced 
for the Space Shuttle Program, it required countless hours of 
analysis and discussion in order to craft an acceptable set of 
operational rules and procedures. In other words, by not 
placing special emphasis on the crew versus public safety 
balance during the design phase, the responsibility for finding 
an acceptable balance fell on the shoulders of the vehicle 
operators and AFSPC Range Safety authorities. In addition, a 
truly optimal balance between crew and public safety could 
not be achieved without significant and costly redesigns. A 
few examples from the Space Shuttle Program include the 
addition of a secondary impact limit line, the removal of the 
External Tank Flight Termination System (FTS), External 
Tank disposal for certain contingency aborts, and the 
compromised Orbiter flight rules for Space Shuttle reentry. 
4.1  Addition of a Secondary Impact Limit Line:  To protect 
the public and critical assets in the launch area vicinity, the ER 
establishes an Impact Limit Line (ILL) that serves as a 
boundary past which debris with greater than a ballistic 
coefficient of 3 psf is not permitted to penetrate in the event of 
a vehicle malfunction and subsequent breakup. Destruct 
criteria are established to ensure the ILL is not violated for an 
errant launch vehicle, and for all launch vehicles except the 
Space Shuttle, there is only one ILL. An exception to the 
single ILL philosophy was granted for the Space Shuttle due 
to crew safety concerns and the unique nature of the Shuttle’s 
“autoloft” guidance logic for abort scenarios. This exception 
was made to account for the fact that the Space Shuttle will 
intentionally modify the pitch profile of the vehicle and 
steepen the trajectory in first stage for the loss of one or more 
Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). This lofting is 
necessary to provide the crew with an abort capability that 
would not otherwise exist, thereby dramatically increasing 
their chances of survival. However, the increased lofting 
results in a violation of the primary ILL despite the vehicle 
remaining in control, continuing to head downrange and flying 
the intended abort profile. Hence, a secondary ILL was 
established for the Shuttle that is further west than the primary 
line. 
For the Space Shuttle ascent, flight termination would only be 
implemented in response to a primary ILL violation if the 
vehicle has exceeded the controllability limits, which are 
defined as pitch or yaw rates in excess of 5 deg/sec for more 
than 5 seconds. If neither the flight control team in the Mission 
Control Center (MCC) in Houston nor the MFCO at Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station can positively determine the 
controllability status of the vehicle, the MFCO would assume 
the Shuttle is still in control and would permit a primary ILL 
violation in accordance with the Space Transportation System 
(STS) flight rules. However, regardless of the vehicle’s 
controllability status, the STS flight rules did not allow a 
violation of the secondary ILL without destruct action being 
triggered in response unless confirmation was received that the 
trajectory deviation was due to the loss of two SSMEs and the 
slight violation occurred late in first stage. Additionally, for 
the loss of two SSMEs, the vehicle must meet the following 
criteria: 1) remain in control, 2) stay within predetermined 
flight azimuth envelopes, 3) transition through maximum 
dynamic pressure without vehicle breakup, and 4) still have its 
instantaneous impact point (IIP) moving downrange. If any of 
these criteria were not met, then destruct action would be 
taken for this dual SSME failure scenario. 
The need to add a secondary ILL for the Shuttle was due to 
inherent design features, or lack thereof, that should have 
taken range safety requirements into account during the early 
design phase of the Space Shuttle. For example, the lack of a 
first stage crew escape system resulted in a complex set of 
operational flight rules and procedures to mitigate any 
increased public risk associated with the vehicle being 
permitted to fly past the primary ILL. For future crewed 
launch vehicles, the ER plans to permit only one ILL. 
Fortunately, new launch vehicle design concepts have all 
included a first stage abort capability that will be designed to 
safely extract the crew module in the event of a major failure 
and/or FTS destruct action. Even with this first stage escape 
capability, careful consideration regarding the balance 
between crew and public safety still needs to factored into 
early design trades to ensure that both crew and public safety 
requirements are being met. 
4.2  Removal of the External Tank FTS:  Following the 
STS-51L Challenger accident in 1986, NASA began a number 
of studies analyzing the breakup process of the Shuttle Solid 
Rocket Boosters (SRBs) from command destruct as well as the 
resulting impact on the neighboring External Tank (ET). “One 
of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission 
investigating the Challenger accident was to remove the ET 
destruct system, a move fully endorsed by the Astronaut 
Office” [15]. The ensuing studies showed that a command 
destruct of the Shuttle SRBs would result in debris penetration 
and breakup of the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank even if the ET 
FTS was removed. The damage to the liquid oxygen (LOX) 
tank was less certain, and therefore an initial decision was 
made by NASA and the 45th Space Wing to only remove the 
FTS on the LH2 portion of the tank. This initial modification 
to the ET FTS occurred in 1992 and was first implemented on 
STS-47. However, several years later, another set of analysis 
studies and discussions resulted in the removal of the FTS on 
the LOX tank as well, which thereby eliminated all command 
destruct capability on the Shuttle ET. To remove the FTS from 
the LOX tank, a more integrated risk assessment was 
performed for both the launch area as well as the downrange 
overflight region. “Results clearly indicated that removal of 
the LOX tank RSS neither dramatically increased total risk 
levels nor created risk levels in excess of the allowable limits. 
This analysis concluded that public and workforce risk are 
within acceptable limits for Shuttle launches with the LOX 
tank RSS ordinance removed” [16]. 
NASA’s primary motivations for removing the FTS on the ET 
were the reduction in vehicle weight and the reduced risk to 
both the crew and vehicle from a low-probability inadvertent 
FTS destruct action. However, both NASA and the Air Force 
were concerned about public safety and wanted to ensure that 
the removal of the ET FTS would not significantly increase 
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the expectation of casualty (EC) values, which remain the 
primary criterion for evaluation of public risk. For first stage 
flight, the primary concern was the possible overpressure that 
may result from an intact LOX and/or LH2 tank impacting the 
launch area following a breakup event. As discussed earlier, 
the LH2 tank was shown to break apart once the SRB FTS was 
invoked, and the risk associated with an intact LOX tank 
impact was shown to be relatively small. For second stage 
flight, NASA and the Air Force agreed that thrust termination 
(i.e. shutdown) of the three liquid fueled SSMEs would 
provide a similar level of safety as a command destruct action. 
This argument was further advanced by analysis results 
showing that the ET would experience aero-thermal breakup 
on reentry for the majority of SSME failure times in second 
stage. In the eyes of range safety authorities at the time, this 
combination of SSME shutdown capability and likely ET 
rupture on reentry was enough to satisfy the intent of the 
public risk requirements during second stage flight. 
The concept of using thrust termination (i.e. SSME shutdown) 
in lieu of FTS command destruct required the incorporation of 
several mitigation techniques that needed to be implemented 
into future Shuttle operational procedures. The first 
modification involved reevaluating and re-designating the 
destruct lines placed along the east coast of the U.S. and 
Canada. These lines no longer represented the point at which 
destruct action needed to be taken but instead signified the 
point at which a manual SSME shutdown needed to occur in 
order to prevent the ET from impacting land. In addition, one 
of the operational roles of the astronauts onboard the vehicle 
changed as well. With their responsibility to terminate thrust 
should the need arise, “the flight crew commander and pilot 
become agents of the 45th Space Wing Commander for public 
safety during the portion of flight after solid rocket booster 
separation and prior to main engine cutoff” [17]. In fact, an 
entire set of flight rules, operational procedures, and training 
materials needed to be drafted or rewritten to reflect the new 
operational paradigm where the flight crew and the MCC 
flight control team were now directly responsible for the real-
time execution of AFSPC Range Safety actions during second 
stage ascent. 
This is one example where the slight increase in public risk 
was deemed to be acceptable by both NASA and Air Force 
authorities in favor of the reduction in crew risk and 
enhancement of the vehicle’s performance capabilities (i.e. 
reduction in vehicle weight). In other words, the benefits to 
crew safety and the launch vehicle program outweighed the 
added risk to the public, which was mitigated through the 
implementation of several operational flight rules and 
procedures. 
4.3  External Tank Disposal for Contingency Aborts:  
Although the Shuttle does not have a crew escape system for 
the ascent phase of flight, it is designed to keep the crew and 
vehicle intact for abort scenarios involving a single SSME 
shutdown. For multiple SSME failures, the vehicle must 
perform a “contingency abort” that is intended to either land 
the Orbiter at an emergency runway location or achieve safe 
conditions for the crew to bailout during the glided flight 
phase. These “contingency aborts” (for multiple engine 
failures) do not include the design protection or continuous 
abort coverage that is associated with “intact aborts” (for 
single engine failures), and therefore have a lower chance of 
success. Once the launch vehicle reaches second stage, the 
likelihood of the crew surviving multiple SSME failures 
begins to increase as more (and safer) abort options become 
available. The risk to the public is also diminished in second 
stage due to the large downrange velocity of the vehicle, the 
ability to terminate thrust by shutting down the SSMEs, and 
the vehicle’s relatively distant proximity to the heavily 
populated areas along the U.S. coastline. Despite these factors, 
there are contingency abort scenarios where the Shuttle’s 
External Tank could pose a risk to downrange landmasses 
along the east coast of the U.S., Newfoundland, or in parts of 
Eurasia. For these off-nominal scenarios, the flight control 
team in the MCC is placed in the precarious position of trying 
to protect the crew while at the same time ensuring that range 
safety criteria are not being violated. 
One example involves a scenario that is occasionally practiced 
by the crew and the MCC flight control team during integrated 
training simulations. The failure scenario involves the loss of 
one SSME during first stage with another engine that is “sick” 
(e.g. leaking Helium, etc.). The sick engine for this scenario is 
predicted to shutdown early enough to prevent the vehicle 
from performing an intact abort. As a result, a contingency 
abort known as an East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) is 
required. The ECAL guidance logic is used to try to steer the 
vehicle closer to the coast during powered flight in an attempt 
to land at one of the ECAL runways. By steering closer to the 
coast, however, the vehicle begins to approach the range 
safety line established to protect the U.S. east coast from 
possible impact by the External Tank. The MCC flight control 
team will monitor the situation and instruct the crew to 
perform an immediate manual shutdown of all SSMEs in the 
event the range safety line is being encroached. By performing 
this manual shutdown earlier than necessary to reach an ECAL 
runway, the crew and the MCC flight control team avoid 
endangering the public but will likely place the crew in a 
situation requiring them to bail out during the glided flight 
phase. 
The aforementioned example illustrates a case where both 
crew and public risk are pushed near their maximum 
acceptable limits. It would be more desirable from a public 
safety standpoint if the vehicle did not intentionally steer 
towards the coast following the SSME failures. In contrast, it 
would be more desirable from a crew safety standpoint to fly 
past the range safety line and shutdown the engines a later 
point in the trajectory, thereby improving the vehicle’s 
chances of safely reaching a runway. In the end, the 
operational procedures were crafted such that the crew was 
given the maximum allowable leeway to deviate towards the 
coast without violating the predetermined range safety criteria. 
However, it is important to note, as seen from this example, 
that extra conservatism in AFSPC Range Safety criteria or 
crew risk mitigations can lead to a situation where the optimal 
balance is not achieved because conservatism on one side or 
the other biased the solution. 
4.4  Compromised Orbiter Flight Rules for Reentry:  The 
Columbia accident highlighted the need for NASA to better 
understand the risk to people on the ground for the Space 
Shuttle entry phase. The Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board (CAIB) observed that NASA should take steps to 
mitigate the risk to all persons and property from Orbiter 
entries. As a result, NASA developed a set of flight rules and 
operational procedures to handle situations where the Orbiter 
may be “compromised,” defined as any condition or failure 
that substantially reduces the likelihood of a nominal entry and 
landing” [18]. Even for a standard entry, certain cross-ranges 
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(i.e. ground-track approaches) “will be avoided in order to 
abate the risk to the general public” assuming all other 
nominal “landing site selection priorities for weather, 
consumables, runway conditions, and entry constraints” are 
satisfied. For a compromised Orbiter, the operational 
considerations for landing site selection become more 
weighted towards protecting the public since a failure or 
damaged condition has already occurred, resulting in a higher 
likelihood of vehicle breakup during entry. By prioritizing 
landing sites differently and avoiding certain cross-ranges, the 
risk to the public for a compromised Orbiter is reduced by 
approximately one order of magnitude when compared to the 
highest risk opportunity to Kennedy Space Center (KSC). 
For a nominal entry, KSC is always given priority over the 
other two primary landing sites, Edwards and Northrop, due to 
lower vehicle turnaround costs. Edwards is then prioritized 
above Northrop, which has only been used once in the 
program’s history and is rarely even considered during 
nominal real-time operations. Crew safety also factors into this 
landing site prioritization since the crew and flight control 
team practice for a landing at KSC or Edwards far more often 
than Northrop. There is also inherent risk in going to a landing 
site that has only been utilized once and is not as familiar to 
the crew or flight control team as the other two primary sites. 
Yet for a compromised Orbiter scenario, Northrop is given 
priority over KSC and Edwards in order to “abate the public 
risk to the extent feasible.” In addition, lower public risk 
ground-track approaches are emphasized for the compromised 
Orbiter scenario. However, by performing orbit adjust 
maneuvers or forgoing good deorbit opportunities in favor of 
more favorable public risk approach trajectories, the crew risk 
inevitably is higher. 
This example illustrates the need to balance crew and public 
risk not only during the ascent phase but during vehicle 
reentry as well. For the Space Shuttle Program, an appropriate 
balance was achieved by prioritizing landing sites and 
selecting ground track approaches with a more public safety 
focus in the event the vehicle becomes damaged or 
experiences a failure at an earlier stage in the mission. 
Achieving this balance required considerable analysis and 
discussion during the Space Shuttle “return to flight” period 
and should have been addressed at an earlier stage in the 
program. 
 
5. LESSONS FROM CONSTELLATION PROGRAM 
The Constellation Program performed many assessments on 
crew and public risk in requirements drafting, design of the 
vehicles, and the overall concept of operations. A few key 
assessments and findings are detailed below. 
5.1  Breakup Event Environment: One of the key products 
that impact both public and crew safety assessments is the 
categorization of the environment resulting from breakup 
scenarios. The prime crew risk outcomes (environment) of a 
breakup event are overpressure, thermal radiation and debris. 
Prime initiators of breakup are FTS initiation, explosion, and 
aerodynamic and thermal load violations. LoC and abort 
effectiveness (i.e. given the abort, how successful is it) 
assessments are done with consideration to spacecraft 
vulnerability using these environments. Of the crew risk 
breakup outcomes, AFSPC Range Safety assessments 
primarily consider the debris environment. The data 
requirements for the debris environment (catalog) are identical 
to support both crew and public risk assessments as the 
physics and the goals (accurate, high fidelity) of defining the 
environment are the same. The basic contents of a debris 
catalog are piece count, mass, aerodynamic characteristics 
(ballistic coefficient), velocity and variability (min/max or 
distribution of the preceding parameters). The timeline of 
interest does vary between the two assessments. AFSPC 
Range Safety assessments are ground focused based on public 
safety concerns, with consideration for risk to commercial 
aircraft. Crew safety assessments have a near field relative 
focus and are spacecraft relative with some far field 
implications (thermal radiation impacts on parachutes). 
Although the application of the breakup environment can 
differ between assessments, the goal of a program should be to 
establish a single product per event and breakup mode that can 
be used for both crew and range safety assessments. 
5.2  Ares FTS Delay Timer: As specified in NASA NPR 
8715.5 [19], any vehicle, stage or payload with propulsive 
capability that poses elevated risk to the public shall have an 
FTS to satisfy range safety requirements. This requirement is 
also in the AFSPC Range Safety governing document 
AFSPCMAN 91-710. The FTS is designed to render each 
propulsive system that has the capability of reaching a 
protected area incapable of propulsion. This includes each 
stage and any strap-on motor of the propulsion system that is 
part of any payload. The timing of the FTS action has been 
shown to impact crew survivability for solid rocket motor 
propulsive vehicles due to the overpressure, debris and 
thermal radiation impacts of the launch vehicle destruction. 
Most FTS designs act immediately upon receipt of the destruct 
command by terminating thrust and dispersing propellants. 
However, immediate FTS action on a crewed vehicle poses a 
significant threat to the crew since additional time is needed 
for the crew to escape the exploding launch vehicle. In order 
to minimize risk to the crew, the Constellation Program 
planned to employ an onboard FTS delay timer. This hardware 
fuse-based timer would insert a delay from when the FTS fire 
command was received onboard to when the destruct 
mechanism was fired. This would allow the crewed launch 
abort vehicle (LAV), consisting of the combined Crew 
Module (CM) and Launch Abort System (LAS), to depart the 
launch vehicle and safely escape the explosion and resulting 
debris field. However, the negative by-product of inserting an 
onboard FTS delay timer is the transfer of increased risk to the 
public due to the longer flight time associated with the 
malfunctioning booster. Optimization of the FTS delay time 
from a crew risk perspective is detailed in Section 5.2.1. 
Public risk concerns associated with the FTS delay timer are 
detailed in Section 5.2.2. Section 5.2.3 summarizes the trade 
between crew and public risk with FTS delay time.  
5.2.1  FTS Delay Time Optimization for Crew Risk: The 
Orion LAS was designed to meet a very basic launch vehicle 
re-contact requirement stating the LAV must be greater than 
175 ft away from the center of gravity of the launch vehicle 3 
seconds after abort. This requirement did not guarantee 
success against debris strikes and in-depth analyses had not 
yet been performed to quantify the risk. Therefore the 
Constellation Program documented and tracked a risk of 
unacceptably high loss of crew due to Orion exposure to the 
debris field generated by either FTS activation or Ares 
structural break-up. In order to quantify and minimize that 
risk, analyses were performed to determine the optimal FTS 
delay time for crew safety.  
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During the design and development phase of the Constellation 
program, several iterations were performed on ascent abort 
debris risk to the crew. Efforts were focused on aborts during 
first stage flight since this portion of flight was nearest to the 
populated coast and the solid propellant first stage booster was 
incapable of being shut down. For these reasons, first stage 
flight posed the greatest risk for FTS action. Early analyses 
focused on vehicle re-contact. Later analyses evolved into 
more complex debris strike analyses. Analysis was performed 
by teams from NASA’s Ames and Johnson Space Centers, 
ATK in Utah, and the 45th Space Wing at Cape Canaveral (i.e. 
the AFSPC range where the vehicle would launch from).  
In an effort to capture the full suite of possible abort 
trajectories, on-track aborts as well as malfunction turn aborts 
were analyzed for re-contact and debris strike probability. On-
track aborts are aborts from a launch vehicle that still has full 
Thrust Vector Control (TVC) control and is flying the target 
trajectory. Malfunction turn aborts are aborts from a launch 
vehicle that has experienced a failure resulting in a noticeable 
trajectory deviation. 
Results concluded that the LAV and current LAS design were 
able to meet the Orion 175 ft re-contact requirement as 
specified but with little margin. On-track and actuator fail-in-
place aborts were the limiting cases since the continuously 
thrusting launch vehicle eventually chases down the LAV and 
passes by. The actuator fail-to-null and hard-over trajectories 
resulted in a malfunction turn or tumbling launch vehicle that 
eliminated the chaser effect. Additionally, during the transonic 
and high dynamic pressure (high Q) phases of the ascent, the 
departing LAV is more quickly decelerated by the atmosphere. 
This further exacerbates the re-contact and debris concern. The 
Ares FTS delay time was optimized based on these limiting 
on-track and fail-in-place transonic and high Q cases. The 
delay provided sufficient time for the LAV to depart the 
launch vehicle and achieve safe separation distance, but not so 
much time to allow the launch vehicle to eventually chase 
down the LAV and destruct in close range. At the time of 
program cancellation, the Constellation Program had not 
received concurrence for the FTS delay time from the AFSPC 
range where the vehicle would be launched. 
Note that the static FTS delay time was optimized for a 
scenario where commanded FTS action would trigger the 
abort. A more likely scenario was that the abort would be 
triggered via onboard anomaly detection. In this scenario, a 
period of time elapses while the MFCO confirms the vehicle 
should be destroyed and then the MFCO sends the command 
to destruct the vehicle. As a result, the vehicle could have an 
FTS breakup event at a non-optimal time from a crew risk 
perspective. At the time of cancellation, the Constellation 
Program was discussing the option of automatically firing the 
FTS when a LAS abort was declared in order to guarantee the 
vehicle would be destroyed at the optimal time. This would 
prevent occurrence of the previously mentioned scenario 
where the MFCO destructs the vehicle as it passes within close 
range of the LAV and would also eliminate the MFCO (i.e. 
human-in-the-loop) from having to manually destroy the 
booster since this would be done automatically onboard. This 
type of abort-initiated, automatic destruct action could result 
in an overall improvement to both crew and public safety if 
properly designed and implemented (i.e. no additional delay 
time beyond the “normal” MFCO FTS activation delay time). 
5.2.2  Public Risk Concerns with an FTS Delay Timer: 
Although application of additional FTS delay provides the 
crew with an opportunity for safe escape of a destructing 
launch vehicle, it will result in an increase in risk to the public 
in the event of an errant-flying vehicle. For aborts early in first 
stage flight when the launch vehicle is still near the east coast 
of Florida, an additional delay of FTS activation may result in 
the debris impact point traversing over land to a populated 
area. As mentioned earlier, the fuse-based FTS delay timer 
onboard is added onto other delays that may be present in the 
onboard and ground systems used to invoke FTS destruct 
action. When MFCO delays (i.e. human reaction time), data 
latency, and other system delays are added to the fuse-based 
timer, the total delay time between the vehicle malfunction 
and the FTS destruct event could approach or exceed an 
unacceptable limit, past which the delay results in a violation 
of AFSPC Range public risk criteria (e.g. an EC violation). 
Furthermore, the vehicle designers must ensure that the FTS 
hardware is located in a region of the structure that is robust 
enough to survive the aerodynamic loads imparted on the 
vehicle during a malfunction turn. As mentioned in Section 
2.1, the FTS must be certified to 99.9% reliability with 95% 
confidence for both the nominal and off-nominal flight 
environment. There are concerns that if the delay in FTS 
activation is too lengthy, the vehicle could lose control and 
exceed structural loading limits during the time period 
between the initial vehicle failure and the time at which the 
FTS activated destruct occurs. In such a scenario, the MFCO 
may have commanded FTS action, but vehicle breakup or 
extreme environments could destroy the FTS or the destruct 
ordnance train during the delay period, thereby preventing the 
FTS from splitting the booster case and dispersing propellants. 
As a result of these factors, all FTS activation timing delays 
need to be closely analyzed from a public safety standpoint 
and would require prior approval from the AFSPC Range (i.e. 
45th Space Wing), the vehicle is launching from before being 
implemented. 
5.2.3  Balancing Crew and Public Risk with FTS Delay: 
The FTS delay time assessment provided a concrete example 
of the complexity in integrating crew and public risk for 
crewed launch vehicles using a solid rocket motor propulsive 
system. From a crew perspective, abort flight is safer if the 
launch vehicle is not destroyed. The capability of the LAV to 
avoid an intact solid rocket motor launch vehicle flyby was 
demonstrated via simulation. It can be argued that complete 
removal of the FTS system would maximize crew 
survivability in the event of an abort. In contrast, from a public 
risk perspective, the launch vehicle could be significantly safer 
if the FTS system destroys the launch vehicle as soon as an 
anomaly is detected. Each second of delay allows the vehicle 
impact point to propagate potentially closer to populated areas 
and allows the FTS system to be compromised due to 
structural and aerodynamic loads associated with the launch 
vehicle failure. FTS delay time was heavily discussed and 
analyzed throughout the life of the Constellation Program. In 
order to assure crew safety is optimized while protecting the 
public from an errant launch vehicle, efforts must be made to 
design a robust FTS system and abort logic that accounts for 
the post FTS action impacts on both LoC and public risk. For 
all future launch vehicle programs, the system designers will 
need to work closely with the AFSPC range where the vehicle 
will be launched to ensure any proposed design solutions are 
not only acceptable from a crew safety standpoint but also 
meet all public safety criteria set forth by the range. 
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5.3  Component Disposal for Ascent Aborts: Both Ares and 
Orion posed safety concerns with component disposal in the 
event of an abort. Section 5.3.1 details disposal concerns for 
Ares. Section 5.3.2 discusses Orion abort disposal concerns. 
Finally, Section 5.3.3 discusses the crew and public risk trades 
associated with abort disposal.  
5.3.1  Ares Component Disposal: Launch to the ISS results 
in nominal overflight of Eurasia immediately prior to Main 
Engine Cut-Off (MECO). The Ares Upper Stage was designed 
to splash down in the Indian Ocean nominally, but for under-
speed scenarios the Upper Stage could impact land. The Ares 
Project performed an entry analysis for under-speed or early 
MECO cases to quantify risk and protect for land impact. For 
Ares, the total overflight exposure begins approximately 10 
seconds before nominal MECO when the vehicle impact point 
intercepts the western European coast. Fig. 2 illustrates the 
overflight risk for one ISS and two lunar mission trajectories. 
The colors correspond to varying early MECO times. For ISS 
launches at the close of the launch window, a brief 1-2 second 
overflight of Newfoundland also occurs. This concern is more 
apparent in abort scenarios, discussed below.  
 
Figure 2. Ares Upper Stage splashdown locations for early 
MECO scenarios. 
5.3.2  Orion Component Disposal for Abort Scenarios: 
Orion components also present a debris risk concern, albeit 
secondary to the Ares Upper Stage scenarios discussed 
previously. Orion LAS aborts occur predominantly in the open 
waters off the coast of Florida. Only an abort from the pad 
poses any concern, where the CM can drift back over land due 
to winds. It was anticipated that this area would be cleared for 
launch so no public risk would exist and Orion meets a 95% 
success criteria for landing in at least 10 feet of water even for 
pad abort cases with wind dispersions. However, Orion 
Service Module (SM) aborts posed a downrange disposal 
concern. An SM abort is an abort during second stage flight 
that relies on the Orion SM for translation and attitude control 
to target a safe orbit or an abort landing area in the North 
Atlantic Ocean. During an SM abort to a landing area, the 
Orion SM and Orion Docking Mechanism (DM) can 
contribute to the debris risk to the public. The primary concern 
for SM aborts is SM/DM impacts on Newfoundland or the 
Hibernia Oil Platform for aborts to the St. John’s abort landing 
area. Abort landing areas are depicted in Fig. 3, along with the 
Downrange Abort Exclusion Zone (DAEZ), an area of the 
North Atlantic that the Orion CM must avoid during ascent 
aborts due to rough sea states and limited recovery capability.  
 
Figure 3. Orion DAEZ and Abort Landing Areas. 
For launches at the close of the launch window, there are 
approximately 20 seconds of exposure to possible SM/DM 
impacts on Newfoundland. In-plane launches do not overfly 
Newfoundland. A similar exposure exists for launches at the 
open of the launch window which overfly the Hibernia Oil 
Platform off the coast of Newfoundland. Again, an in-plane 
launch alleviates the concern.  
5.3.3  Abort Disposal Crew and Public Risk Trades: While 
disposal concerns existed and were quantified to some degree 
for the Constellation Program, no requirements for Ares Upper 
Stage or Orion component disposal existed within the program 
(at the time of cancellation) for failure or abort scenarios. 
While it was anticipated that the program would minimize 
public risk operationally when designing aborts, there was still 
a trade with crew safety versus public safety that needed to be 
analyzed. For example, if a performance anomaly occurred 
during ascent that resulted in a projected under-speed where 
debris could impact Eurasia, one option that could be 
considered involves shutting down the engine early to avoid 
the disposal concern. The resulting effect on the crew may be 
a longer or more performance limited burn that could result in 
a different insertion orbit and increase the risk to the crew. 
Many of these trades could be performed later for the final 
operational vehicles, but the Constellation Program performed 
analyses during the preliminary design cycle in order to feed 
back improvements into the design. The responsible AFSPC 
Range (i.e. 45th Space Wing) did not have the opportunity to 
complete a personnel and critical asset risk analysis for the 
downrange portion of a launch of the Ares vehicle prior to the 
cancellation of the program. Similar to the FTS delay time 
discussion, the system designers for future launch vehicles 
will need to work closely with the AFSPC range where the 
vehicle will be launched to ensure all public safety criteria set 
forth by the range are being met.  
5.4  CM Raise Maneuver for Orion Reentry: For the 
vehicle reentry phase, all public safety responsibilities reside 
with the range user (e.g. NASA) in accordance with AFI 91-
217 and the National Space Policy. To ensure public safety for 
nominal reentry, Orion is required to dispose of the service 
module and docking mechanism in the open ocean at least 25 
nmi from U.S. land masses and 200 nmi from foreign land 
masses. The CM, drogue chutes, and other items jettisoned 
below 50,000 ft are required to impact within the primary 
landing zone around San Clemente, CA. In order to jettison 
the SM and DM early enough along the entry trajectory and 
still get the CM far enough downrange to hit the landing zone, 
a controlled CM downrange burn was inserted in to the entry 
timeline.  
Notional reentry splashdown locations for the SM, DM, and 
CM are shown in Fig. 4 for both ascending and descending 
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approaches. The CM raise burn and lifting entry allow the CM 
to fly further downrange to the landing site, while the SM and 
DM fall through a steeper ballistic entry to an area outside the 
coastal keep-out zones.  
 
Figure 4. Notional reentry CM/SM/DM splashdown locations. 
The CM raise burn was designed to reduce both public and 
crew risk by ensuring compliance with the 200 nmi disposal 
requirement while dropping the crew within the target landing 
zone. Without the burn, the crew and public risk splashdown 
requirements could not be concurrently met. The CM raise 
burn also reduced crew risk because CM to SM range at the 
anticipated time of SM aerodynamic break-up was increased. 
While more analysis was necessary on SM break-up 
dynamics, addition of the CM raise burn could only reduce the 
risk.  
5.5  Ares First Stage Linear Shape Charge Extension: 
During the lifetime of the Space Shuttle Program, numerous 
risk assessments and sensitivity studies were performed to 
characterize the risk to the public for various failure scenarios 
during ascent. One such study conducted by the ER Safety 
office showed that approximately 80% of the overall risk, as 
quantified by the EC estimate, was attributable to the lack of a 
Linear Shape Charge (LSC) on the aft segment of the Shuttle 
SRBs. This lesson learned was successfully carried forward 
into the Constellation Program which would utilize a five-
segment version of the same solid rocket motor design for the 
first stage of the Ares vehicle. Early in the Constellation 
Program as part of the Ares I-X test flight, NASA and the 45th 
Space Wing personnel coordinated to ensure that the LSC was 
extended to include the aft segment of the booster. This new 
design was successfully implemented and flown on Ares I-X 
and was included in the baseline design for the crewed Ares 
launch vehicle that was being developed at the time. 
The LSC extension was estimated to result in roughly the 
same 80% public risk reduction for Ares as was shown for the 
STS. In addition, a reduction in the risk to the crew was 
expected as well since the destruct lines for Ares would be less 
stringent, thereby allowing for more room to maneuver or 
recover from a vehicle malfunction before destruct action 
would need to be taken. This dramatic improvement to both 
public and crew safety was certainly worth the additional cost 
to incorporate the design change. Finally, the coordination 
between NASA and the ER during the LSC extension activity 
highlights the benefits of frequent discussions between the two 
organizations, particularly in the early design phase of the 
launch vehicle when modifications such as this one are easier 
and less costly to incorporate. 
 
6. FAA LESSONS LEARNED 
Analyses initiated after the Columbia accident demonstrated 
that a real-time system to track a launch or re-entry vehicle 
and activate aircraft hazard areas in the event of a catastrophic 
break-up may be necessary to provide a high level of aircraft 
protection without excessive impact on normal air-traffic 
patterns [20, 21]. In the wake of the Columbia accident, the 
FAA partnered with NASA to protect aircraft from potential 
Space Shuttle orbiter reentry hazards by using a set of 
procedures and tools that provide FAA air traffic managers 
and controllers with increased situational awareness before 
and during reentry missions. Past papers have described some 
of the key lessons that resulted from specific air traffic 
management needs, and many of the lessons learned were 
captured as requirements for a next-generation FAA tool that 
will provide similar capabilities during the planning and 
operational phases of the launches and reentries of future 
commercial space vehicles [22]. 
Even an upper-stage reentry break-up can produce risks that 
exceed U.S. consensus standards (e.g. above 1E-7 probability 
of an impact capable of causing a casualty) in areas of 
significant air-traffic [23]. Several U.S. agencies have 
collaborated on the development of aircraft vulnerability 
models and range safety standards that facilitate space 
transportation and mitigate the risk to aircraft from launch or 
reentry vehicle hazards [24]. The FAA continues to sponsor 
significant efforts, including tests and analyses, to develop 
such tools and standards because the optimal integration of 
space and air-traffic into the National Air Space requires 
rigorous measures that ensure the safety of occupants of all 
types of vehicles, as well as people on the ground.  
The traditional ELV approach, which was codified in 14 CFR 
417, uses a FTS designed and operated to protect populated 
(or otherwise protection) areas from debris impacts that 
exceed a ballistic coefficient of 3 psf. The traditional ELV 
approach includes Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) to 
demonstrate compliance with consensus requirements to limit 
collective and individual risks to the public [5]. Since the 
traditional ELV approach does NOT entail an examination of 
the conditional risks to the public given an FTS activation 
event occurs, it could limit occupied vehicle flights and 
produce elevated risks for vehicle occupants even if the threat 
to the public is extremely low. The FAA’s current RLV 
regulations (14 CFR Part 431) acknowledge that an FTS may 
not be optimal for some RLV missions, including crewed 
suborbital rockets. SpaceShipOne demonstrated that a 
relatively benign suborbital vehicle (without highly toxic or 
explosive propellants onboard) with a pilot can demonstrate 
compliance with the FAA’s current public safety requirements 
for RLV missions without using a traditional flight termination 
system. 
The first Dragon reentry mission demonstrated that the current 
collective public risk limit of no more the 30E-6 EC due to 
debris from lift-off through landing is difficult to comply with 
for an orbital reusable vehicle [12]. Although the launch 
azimuth for that mission resulted in a fairly low risk to the 
public from launch, it corresponded to an orbital inclination 
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with a relatively high conditional risk given a failure that 
would lead to a random reentry [25]. The FAA estimated a 
relatively high expectation of casualty due to the possibility of 
a Dragon failure that would lead to a random reentry. Earlier 
studies showed that even a relatively mature orbital reusable 
vehicle would likely exceed FAA risk criteria due to potential 
debris hazards from lift off through landing for any coincident 
launch and landing point within the continental U.S. A more 
practical and common approach is to set separate risk limits of 
100E-6 EC for launch and 100E-6 EC for reentry [5,26] as 
implemented in accordance with AFI 91-217 at AFSPC 
Ranges for all non-licensed (DoD/Civil) launches. 
 
7. 45TH SPACE WING LESSONS LEARNED 
7.1  Overall Probability of Failure and Allocation: Risk 
analysis is a process that is dependent upon mathematical 
models with many parameters that are used to simulate the 
consequences of vehicle failures and the resulting hazardous 
events. The models are approximations at various levels of 
sophistication and the model parameters are frequently 
difficult to quantify accurately. Consequently, the results of 
these studies can have considerable uncertainty. Even among 
the most proven models there can be significant differences in 
results when using the same set of input data. Thus, results 
from risk analysis programs have uncertainty coming from 
both the model designs and the model parameters. The two 
categories of uncertainty that occur in a risk analysis are 
aleatory and epistemic. 
Aleatory uncertainty is the uncontrollable variability of events; 
typified by the distribution of debris impacts from one 
accident to another (the same initial conditions will not 
produce exactly the same consequences in sequential trials). In 
launch risk analysis models, the effect of aleatory uncertainty 
is most frequently averaged in the process of determining 
impact probability or expectation of casualty, EC. In fact, EC is 
the average number of casualties when considering all of the 
aleatory uncertainties.  
Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty in the model and the 
model parameters. The model and parameters may contain 
inadequacies that introduce model or systematic uncertainty. If 
epistemic uncertainty is accounted for, then the computed EC 
is no longer a point value but represented by a probability 
distribution. Epistemic (or model) uncertainty must account 
for any bias or conservatism in the model. 
From a launch risk analysis point of view, aleatory uncertainty 
is the randomness in the occurrence and consequences of a 
launch accident (i.e. uncertainties that are irreducible). 
Epistemic uncertainty represents the uncertainty in the ability 
of the model to compute the true risk, and thus can be reduced 
by model improvements. 
Failure probability uncertainty usually dominates the total 
uncertainty in a risk analysis for new vehicles. Uncertainty in 
the failure probability generally decreases as the vehicle 
matures, so the number of launches is an important factor. The 
occurrence of a failure is aleatory. The probability distribution 
describing the uncertainty in probability of failure can be used 
to reflect aleatory and epistemic sources of uncertainty. 
Table 1. Uncertainties and Biases to be Considered in Launch 
Risk Analysis. 
 
Tab. 1 provides a summary of the uncertainties and biases 
associated with a vehicle failure probability that could be 
encountered when calculating the risk to personnel during a 
launch. The table also categorizes the sources, defines the 
uncertainty type and its bias for a probability of failure input 
parameter, and gives a general indication of the relative 
importance to the uncertainty in the computed risk. 
The failure probability uncertainty model is better if it 
accounts for uncertainty levels separately in each of the stages 
or flight phases and for different failure modes. There is also 
the issue of the probability distribution of failure versus time. 
Failure probabilities can be biased because of conservative 
predictions by the AFSPC Range Safety office that governs 
the range a vehicle is launching from. Although the 
conservatism is appropriate in an analysis without uncertainty, 
it should be removed before making the uncertainty 
determination. The uncertainty analysis should be making an 
“unbiased estimate” of the average EC and the uncertainty 
distribution of EC. It has been the AFSPC Range Safety 
office’s experience that range users have a tendency to under 
predict the failure probability of their vehicles when compared 
to empirical launch vehicle failure data. Since the range user 
does not have final authority for public safety on an AFSPC 
range, their developed overall vehicle probability of failure 
numbers have not been used by AFSPC Range Safety officials 
when calculating/assessing the risk to personnel and critical 
assets associated with any launch occurring on an AFSPC 
range. Instead AFSPC Range Safety officials calculate their 
own overall vehicle probability of failure rate and allocation 
for all vehicles launching from an AFSPC range, and use this 
value when assessing the risk to personnel and critical assets 
in accordance with the AFSPC range commander’s safety 
program (AFPSCMAN 91-710). 
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most straight 
forward; 
changes with 
the number of 
launches
Most 
predictors are 
deliberately 
conservative
Dominant for 
new vehicles; 
less so as the 
vehicle 
matures
Must be 
evaluated by 
stage
Weighting of 
relative 
importance of 
previous flight 
success/failure 
experience
Epistemic
Currently not 
modeled
No intended 
bias
Not a major 
effect on Ec 
uncertainty
Failure rate vs. 
time
Failure rate is 
aleatory; its 
uncertainty is 
epistemic
Currently not 
modeled
A bias vs. time 
is created if the 
failure rate vs. 
time is not 
modeled 
properly
Highest with 
stages having 
high failure 
probability
Vehicle failure 
response 
mode (VFRM) 
allocation
Epistemic
Currently not 
modeled
No intended 
bias
Can have a big 
effect on Ec 
uncertainty
Manufacturer 
predictions of 
VFRM 
allocations 
seem to 
underestimate 
malfunction 
turn 
probability 
history
Discrete event 
failure 
probabilities
Aleatory
Currently not 
modeled
No bias
Depends 
upon the case
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For the Space Shuttle Program, the overall probability of 
failure published by NASA has at times differed from that of 
the ER Safety office by more than an order of magnitude. 
Over the 30-year course of the program, NASA and Air Force 
probability of failure estimates have slowly converged to a 
point where in January 2011, NASA published revised Space 
Shuttle reliability numbers that closely resembled the AFSPC 
derived failure rates that were used by the ER over the lifetime 
of the program. To address new launch vehicle development 
under the Constellation Program, additional discussions 
between NASA and the ER Safety office arose regarding the 
probability of failure estimation process. One such discussion 
that surfaced for the Ares I-X test flight involved trying to find 
a way to merge the best features of both the NASA bottom-up 
failure rate quantification process, which is based more on 
systems design, and the AFSPC top-down failure rate 
determination, which utilizes empirical launch vehicle failure 
data and is standardized for all launch vehicles. This series of 
discussions led to a new breakthrough in which a joint team 
from NASA and the 45th Space Wing developed a first flight 
adjustment methodology that bridged the gap between 
otherwise differing probability of failure estimates. “The 
method starts with the Air Force’s generic failure probability 
estimate for first flight and adjusts the value based on the 
complexity of the vehicle as compared to the complexity of a 
generic vehicle. The results show an estimated vehicle average 
of 26% probability of failure versus 30% derived by the 
Common Standards Working Group [27], so there is relatively 
good agreement. The methodology used will continue to 
evolve [for future launch vehicles]” [28].  
7.2  Crewed Space Flight Propulsive Systems: Based on 
past experience for both the Space Shuttle and Constellation 
Programs, it was evident to AFSPC Range Safety officials that 
liquid propulsion provides certain advantages over large solid 
rocket motors when trying to balance crew and public safety 
for crewed space flight. As discussed in section 5.2, changes 
proposed by the range user in an effort to increase crew 
survivability (e.g. removal of destruct ordinance, delaying 
destruct time, etc.) tend to increase the risk to personnel and 
critical assets in the launch area. For liquid propulsion launch 
vehicles, thrust can be terminated prior to activation of the 
FSS, thereby allowing for “extended” delay times to ensure 
crew safety without adversely affecting the safety of personnel 
and critical assets in the launch area or downrange overflight 
region.  
Underscoring one of the advantages liquid propulsion has over 
large solid rocket motors for crewed space flight is a recent 
analysis completed by the AFSPC ER Safety office (45 
SW/SE) showing that for “mature” vehicles FTS ordinance 
can be removed from the vehicle and a Thrust Termination 
System (TTS) is an acceptable FSS solution on the ER. 
Analysis shows that there is no increase in public safety and 
critical asset risk when comparing FTS vs. TTS for “mature” 
liquid propulsive vehicles. Removal of FTS ordnance from 
liquid vehicles will not only result in a cost reduction 
(~$1M/mission) and a slight increase in payload to orbit 
capability (~300 lbs), but it will also remove the inadvertent 
destruct concerns that exist in a crewed space flight program. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the differences between FTS destruct and a 
TTS solution. 
 
Figure 5. Differences between FTS methods. 
Aside from the public safety considerations outlined here, the 
authors recognize that solid rocket motors offer some unique 
advantages versus liquid propulsion in other areas. The pros 
and cons of liquid versus solid rocket motors span numerous 
technical and non-technical discussions and are outside the 
scope of this paper. 
7.3  Coordination between Government Agencies for 
Public Safety: Over the years, multiple government agencies, 
specifically AFSPC, NASA, and the FAA, have developed 
requirements and criteria in various documents that address 
launch vehicle public safety. There has been a concerted effort 
to ensure that launch vehicle public safety requirements and 
criteria recently published by NASA and the FAA mirror 
those that have been published by the governing AFSPC 
ranges for over 40 years. The result of this effort is multiple 
government agencies (AFSPC, NASA, and the FAA) 
enforcing public safety requirements on an AFSPC Range in 
support of crewed and non-crewed spaceflight. Prior to 
recently published NASA and FAA public safety 
requirements, a launch provider only had to meet AFPSC 
Range public safety requirements when launching a 
commercial, DoD, or civil mission from an AFSPC Range. 
Duplication of public safety requirements and 
roles/responsibilities is not an issue when launching from a 
non-AFSPC Range in that a launch operator launching any 
commercially licensed vehicle, whether crewed or non-crewed 
from a non-AFSPC range needs only to demonstrate 
compliance with FAA public safety requirements. While it is 
critically important to ensure consistency between federal 
agencies that govern and/or support U.S. domestic launch 
activity, it is also important to avoid duplicating efforts and/or 
imposing matching requirements that could result in potential 
waste and inefficiency when multiple agencies are involved in 
the launch of commercially licensed crewed/non-crewed 
vehicles from an AFSPC Range. During this early stage of 
developing commercial crew transport capabilities to low 
earth orbit, as well as for future civil launch vehicle 
development, proper coordination between federal agencies is 
essential. Once it has been determined that the involvement of 
multiple government agencies is necessary to ensure launch 
and reentry public safety from an AFSPC Range, the key 
lessons learned to avoid duplication and burdensome 
requirements can be summarized as follows: 
1) establish an interagency forum, such as a range 
safety panel or the Common Standards Working Group, 
to facilitate coordinated safety related decision-making 
and approval processes, particularly to evaluate non-
compliance requests or meets intent certifications, and  
2) develop an approach to safety evaluations that 
accounts for the potentially different timetables used by 
each agency in the evaluation of compliance with their 
requirements. 
7.3.1  NASA Public Safety Involvement at AFPSC Ranges: 
The purpose of Attachment A to NMI 1052.31, the 
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Webb/McNamara Agreement, 1963 [29], was to set forth the 
general concept of operations by DoD and NASA and to fix 
responsibilities for specific functions carried out at the ER (i.e. 
CCAFS/KSC) to include all downrange assets. This 
Agreement supersedes all other agreements, and where there 
are inconsistencies between other DoD/NASA agreements, 
provisions in the Webb/McNamara Agreement govern.  
The DoD is the single manager responsible for the 
development, operation, and management of range facilities of 
the ER as a national asset, providing common range services 
to all missile and space vehicle launch programs of the DoD 
and NASA. In order to ensure a maximum of mutual 
assistance and a minimum of duplication, both DoD and 
NASA must inform each other of their plans and requirements 
and consult fully regarding their activities.  
Range operation functions which are of such nature that any 
division of responsibility between agencies is impractical or 
undesirable is the responsibility of the DoD. The DoD is 
responsible for the following functions in support of 
operations of both DoD and NASA: 
1) Control of ER resources during range operations and 
coordination with launch agency operations, 
2) Flight/Public Safety, 
3) Air Traffic Coordination, and 
4) Sea Surveillance. 
When launching from an AFSPC Range, NASA should review 
the AFSPC range governing document, AFSPCMAN 91-710, 
to ensure that their public safety requirements as contained in 
NPR 8715.5 are adequately captured in the overarching 
AFSPC range document. This was successfully done for the 
Constellation Program where NASA and 45th Space Wing 
personnel worked together through a range safety panel to 
create a joint tailored document that merged NPR 8715.5 and 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 as well as tailored the requirements to 
the specific vehicle being developed (i.e. Ares/Orion). During 
this process, it was evident that the vast majority of 
requirements in NPR 8715.5 were nearly identical to the 
corresponding requirement(s) listed in AFSPCMAN 91-710. 
The Webb/McNamara Agreement, written in 1963, made a 
concerted effort to minimize duplication between DoD and 
NASA and to define roles and responsibilities. Although 
NASA range safety program requirements outlined in NPR 
8715.5 are certainly appropriate for ranges that NASA owns 
and operates, such as the Wallops Flight Facility, care should 
be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication for launches at 
ranges controlled and operated by AFSPC. 
7.3.2  FAA Public Safety Involvement at AFPSC Ranges: 
As detailed in Section 2.2, FAA regulations focus on public 
safety requirements for commercially licensed launch vehicles 
because of the CSLAA of 2004. Currently there are no 
scheduled commercially licensed crewed space flights on the 
launch manifest at AFSPC ranges. 
Per AFSPCI 10-1208 [30], paragraph 2.3.2, “cooperative 
involvement between 30 SW and 45 SW with FAA-licensed 
activities helps maintain the competitiveness of the US space 
industrial base in the world economy and promotes our 
national strength in space. AFSPC retains public safety and 
resource protection responsibilities for all activities on 
Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station.” Paragraph 2.3.2 continues with, “for FAA-licensed 
launches, the FAA remains statutorily responsible for public 
health and safety, the safety of property, and national security 
or foreign policy interests of the United States under the 
CSLA. Additionally, the FAA-licensed company conducting 
the launch also retains responsibility for public safety of any 
launch it conducts from an AF range. Regardless of the type of 
activity (including FAA-licensed launches), AFSPC/CC, 
through his/her launch wing commanders, is responsible for 
the launch operation.” In an attempt to detail roles and 
responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force and the 
FAA for overseeing safety of commercial space launch and 
reentry from AFPSC ranges the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force and the FAA Administrator signed a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) for Space Transportation and Range 
Activities in 2007. One of the objectives of the AF/FAA MOA 
of 2007 is to minimize the regulatory burden on the U.S. 
commercial space sector by clearly delineating federal agency 
requirements, oversight responsibilities, and consolidating AF 
and FAA documentation products where possible, thereby 
precluding unnecessary overlap and duplication. 
The AF/FAA MOA of 2007 includes a goal to ensure that 
common safety requirements exist for launches taking place at 
AFSPC ranges, but clearly this has proven difficult to achieve 
in practice because requirements tend to evolve at a different 
pace for each agency. Case in point, AFSPC ranges adopted a 
separate general public aggregated risk criteria of 100x10-6 EC 
for launch and reentry with the publication of AFI 91-217 in 
February, 2010. AFI 91-217 simply incorporated aggregated 
risk criteria as detailed first in RCC 321-07, which was further 
updated to RCC 321-10. Currently the FAA regulations with 
risk acceptability criteria have not been updated and thus 
reflect an older standard [26]. Since FAA rule making is part 
of the Code of Federal Register changes to must abide by the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which involves public 
comments, etc. and take considerably more time than it takes 
the Air Force to change its requirements. In the meantime, 
commercially licensed launches, even from Air Force ranges, 
must follow the current FAA regulations. Thus, commercially 
licensed launches are currently held to a more restrictive 
criterion on AFSPC ranges when compared with non-licensed 
launches, i.e. DoD and civil (NASA) missions, unless a waiver 
is granted by the FAA.  
The AF/FAA MOA of 2007 also states that the FAA will rely 
on AF safety processes for the review of all licensed launches 
from AF launch ranges for compliance with common safety 
requirements, provided that the FAA’s LSSA of the AF launch 
ranges find that the AF safety process, procedures, and 
requirements implemented for each licensed launch satisfy 
FAA requirements, specifically 14 C.F.R. Ch III, Subchapter 
C, part 417. The FAA’s LSSA of each AF launch range 
provides a basis for the FAA’s reliance on the adequacy of the 
safety-related launch property and services provided by the AF 
to licensed launch operators. In essence, LSSAs are the FAA’s 
mechanism for assessing the capabilities of the respective 
range safety organizations to protect public health and safety, 
when a range provides services to commercial launch 
companies. Once an LSSA has been completed the FAA does 
not duplicate analyses performed by the federal launch range 
according to approved processes. The FAA has issued an 
LSSA for the AFPSC ER, but in some cases has performed 
what could be considered duplicate risk analyses in order to 
meet the regulatory timetable for license evaluations, resulting 
in different risk estimates at various times during the safety 
evaluation process. An example of this is for the first Falcon 
9/Dragon reentry mission. Just prior to launch when a 
complete set of final data were available, AFSPC Range (ER) 
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personnel performed a debris risk analysis from launch to 
orbital insertion that estimated an expectation of casualty that 
indicated compliance with FAA regulations. However, in 
order to make a license determination well in advance of the 
launch date, the FAA estimated the debris risk using only 
preliminary data that indicated potential non-compliance with 
the risk criteria used for licensing, such that a waiver was 
sought and granted [12]. Recognizing that input data and state-
of-the-art methods often evolve over time, the FAA and ER 
have developed a process to jointly review and approve 
baseline risk analysis input data and methods that account for 
the different timetables used by each agency in their safety 
evaluations. For commercially licensed launches from the 
AFSPC ER both the FAA and ER will concur on a set of 
baseline risk analysis input parameters early in a launch flow. 
Once concurrence between the two organizations has been 
achieved AFSPC Range Safety personnel will complete the 
risk analysis for the commercially licensed launch in question. 
This analysis will then be used by both organizations to assess 
compliance with their respective requirements. 
 
8. INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL APPROACH  
Recent work done by the RCC Risk Committee outlined the 
steps involved in an innovative QRA approach that could 
provide a better balance between crew and public risk than the 
traditional ELV approach: “conditional risk management” for 
events that may involve a “safety intervention.”  The term 
“safety intervention” is used to encompass the entire range of 
risk mitigating actions that may be proposed for either 
Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) or Reusable Launch 
Vehicles (RLVs), whether occupied or not. Activation of a 
FTS is an example of a common safety intervention for ELVs, 
and a contingency abort to an alternative landing site is an 
important safety intervention for an RLV.  
Fig. 6 outlines a systematic QRA approach to manage risks 
associated with safety interventions developed by the RCC 
Risk Committee [5]. The sequence of steps shown in Fig. 6 
was designed to assure completeness and avoid unnecessary 
efforts whenever possible. The figure shows the “conditional 
risk management approach” has two termination points. Step 
12 is the final step if the analysis shows no potential for “high 
consequence events” and the probability of a safety 
intervention is determined de minimis. Step 13 is the last step 
if a complete analysis reveals the conditional risks from the 
safety intervention actions are acceptable.  
The conditional risk management approach is intended to 
supplement the current risk management requirements of RCC 
321-10 and assure that the proposed safety interventions 
address unacceptable levels of “high consequence” conditional 
risks and introduce reasonable conditional risks when the 
interventions actions are taken. Note that this Figure includes 
many undefined terms and criteria, such as a “remote” 
probability, “high consequence hazards,” acceptable 
conditional collective and individual risks, etc. Even though 
“high consequences hazards” are not formally defined in the 
U.S. consensus standard for launch and reentry risk 
acceptability, these would obviously include hazards that 
could result in long term or irreversible consequences, such as 
public casualties, major environmental impacts, and negative 
impacts on the national security or foreign policy interests of 
the U.S. Even in the absence of consensus on important 
definitions of terms used in Fig. 6, the process shown can still 
be useful to evaluate the efficacy of a particular safety 
intervention if reasonable safety goals are accepted for a given 
launch or reentry vehicle. For example, if it was accepted that 
abort action should by planned to ensure (1) no more than 
10% probability of casualty for occupants of a launch vehicle 
(people voluntarily exposed to risk), and (2) the conditional 
risks to the uninvolved public are three orders of magnitude 
lower than those voluntarily accepted by the vehicle occupants 
[31], then the design and operation of the vehicle should 
ensure that the uninvolved public are subject to no more than 
0.1% probability of casualty given an abort action is 
implemented.  
While the risk management process, including traditional 
QRAs and conditional risk analyses, may be useful in planning 
for contingency aborts, etc. for occupied launch or reentry 
vehicles, especially those under autonomous control, the 
design and operation of piloted vehicles should also account 
for longstanding rules governing emergency situations and 
decision-making theory as well. For example, in an in-flight 
emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command 
generally has been given the freedom to deviate from any 
requirement to the extent necessary to cope with the 
emergency, and later file a report to document the 
circumstances and rationale for that deviation. The history of 
aviation emergencies includes many cases where pilots have 
taken extraordinary measures to protect the public from a 
crash landing. Furthermore, acceptable safety mitigations 
should normally be expected to reduce the total and 
conditional risks relative to no mitigation. However, 
extenuating circumstances, such as national security or foreign 
policy interests, might warrant accepting higher safety risks 
from applying a safety mitigation compared to no mitigation. 
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Figure 6. Conditional Risk Management Approach for Safety Interventions [5] 
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9. SUMMARY 
This paper documents how the experiences of the development 
and operation of the Space Shuttle, as well as the preliminary 
design of the Constellation crew and launch vehicles, has 
proven that proper attention to range and crew safety 
requirements must be given early in the design phase to avoid 
additional operational complexities and ensure an optimal 
balance of risks to the public and people on-board. For 
example, unrealistic probability of launch abort estimates 
enabled certain Shuttle design features that placed crew and 
public safety at odds with each other. While these risks were 
eventually mitigated and balanced for the Space Shuttle 
Program, it required countless hours of effort to craft an 
acceptable set of operational rules and procedures. In addition, 
a truly optimal balance between crew and public safety could 
not be achieved without significant and costly redesigns. 
Examples from the Space Shuttle Program include the addition 
of a secondary impact limit line, the removal of the External 
Tank FTS, External Tank disposal for certain contingency 
aborts, and the compromised Orbiter flight rules for reentry. 
Abort planning analyses performed during the preliminary 
design phase for Constellation identified several areas where 
the design should address crew and public safety 
simultaneously. For example, the delay between activation of 
the launch abort vehicle (LAV) used to separate the crew 
vehicle from the launch vehicle and the termination of the 
launch vehicle flight should be designed to provide sufficient 
time for the LAV to depart the launch vehicle and achieve a 
safe separation distance, but not so much time that the launch 
vehicle chases down the LAV and destructs in close range, 
which can expose the crew vehicle to substantial risk from 
debris impacts. When employing a solid rocket motor 
propulsive system for a crewed mission any time delay in the 
activation of the FSS will result in additive risk to the general 
public. Recent AFSPC Range Safety analyses indicate that 
liquid propulsion provide an advantage over large solid rocket 
motors when integrating crew and public safety for crewed 
space flight because thrust can be terminated prior to 
activation of the flight safety system, thereby allowing for 
“extended” delay times to ensure crew safety without 
adversely affecting the safety of personnel and critical assets 
in the launch area or downrange over-flight region.  
Another key lesson learned from the Shuttle and Constellation 
programs is that a vehicle developer should not establish crew 
safety design requirements or solutions in technical areas 
where crew and public safety intertwine without the 
involvement of the organization(s) responsible for public 
safety during launch and/or reentry. For example, the 
Constellation program found that if a performance anomaly 
occurred during ascent produced a projected under-speed 
where debris from the service module disposal could impact 
Eurasia, the engines might be shut down early to avoid the 
disposal debris risk to the public, but the result on the crew 
might be a longer crew capsule burn that could increase the 
risk to the crew. The Constellation program did not find a 
solution for that trade prior to cancellation; the AFSPC Range 
responsible for public safety was not yet engaged on that 
issue. 
The increased activities involving crewed commercially 
licensed space transportation has highlighted the benefits of 
non-traditional approaches to safety. For example, the FAA’s 
current RLV regulations acknowledge that a traditional FTS 
may not be optimal for some RLV missions, including crewed 
suborbital rockets. SpaceShipOne showed that a relatively 
benign suborbital vehicle (without highly toxic or explosive 
propellants onboard) with a pilot can demonstrate compliance 
with the FAA’s current public safety requirements for RLV 
missions without using a traditional flight termination system. 
Along those same lines the AFSPC ER safety office has also 
recently completed an analysis that supports the removal of 
FTS ordnance from a “mature” liquid propulsive vehicle 
thereby allowing a TTS to be an acceptable FSS solution on 
the ER.  
Recent experience where multiple government agencies are 
responsible for public safety during the launch/reentry of a 
commercially licensed crewed space vehicle indicates that 
duplication and potentially conflicting requirements must be 
avoided to the greatest extent possible. The responsible 
government agencies (AF, FAA, and NASA) have made a 
concerted effort to limit duplication by signing high-level 
agreements written specifically to address roles and 
responsibilities when launching any vehicle from an AFSPC 
Range. To further assist in the compliance and  
implementation of these agreements, each agency has worked 
cooperatively to ensure: 1) safety-related decision-making and 
approval processes, particularly when evaluating non-
compliance requests or “meets intent” certifications, do not 
increase the work load imposed on a range user/licensee, and 
2) AFSPC Range Safety offices complete safety 
evaluations/analyses in a timely manner so as to account for 
potentially different timetables used by each agency in the 
evaluation of compliance with their public safety 
requirements.  
Current range safety requirements in the US are focused on 
ensuring public safety, but allow innovative approaches to 
integrate public and on-board safety, such as conditional risk 
management. Recent experience demonstrates that real-time 
systems and conditional risk management may be helpful in 
the integration of public and occupant safety. Analyses 
initiated after the Columbia accident demonstrated that a real-
time system to track a launch or re-entry vehicle and activate 
aircraft hazard areas in the event of a catastrophic break-up 
may be necessary to provide a high level of aircraft protection 
without excessive impact on normal air-traffic patterns. A 
real-time system needs to manage conditional risks because 
the emergency event has occurred. RCC 321-10 has 
introduced a conditional risk management approach intended 
to supplement the current consensus risk management 
requirements and assure that safety interventions implemented 
(e.g. abort actions) produce reasonable conditional risks and 
address unacceptable levels of “high consequence” conditional 
risks.  
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11. ACRONYMS 
AF Air Force 
AFI Air Force Instruction 
AFSPC Air Force Space Command 
AFSPC/CC AFSPC Commander 
AFSPCI AFSPC Instruction 
AFSPCMAN AFSPC Manual 
ATK Alliant Techsystems Inc., 
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
CSLAA Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 
CM Crew Module 
DAEZ Downrange Abort Exclusion Zone 
DM Docking Mechanism 
DoD Department of Defense 
EC Expected Casualties 
ECAL East Coast Abort Landing 
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 
ER Eastern Range 
ET External Tank 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FSS Flight Safety System 
FTS Flight Termination System 
High Q high dynamic pressure 
HQ Headquarters 
IIP Instantaneous Impact Point 
ILL Impact Limit Line 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LAS Launch Abort System 
LAV Launch Abort Vehicle 
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen 
LoC Loss of Crew 
LOX Liquid Oxygen 
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LSSA Launch Site Safety Assessments 
LSC Linear Shape Charge 
MAJCOM Major Command 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MECO Main Engine Cut-Off 
MFCO Mission Flight Control Officer 
NASA National Aeronautics & Space Administration 
nmi nautical miles 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 
PC Probability of Casualty 
psf pounds per square foot 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RCC Range Commanders Council 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
RSS Range Safety System 
RTS Range Tracking System 
SM Service Module 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 
STS Space Transportation System 
SW/CC Space Wing Commander 
TDTS Telemetry Data Transmitting Station 
TTS Thrust Termination System 
TVC Thrust Vector Control 
U.S. United States 
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